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Loss aversion can occur in riskless and risky choices. Yet, there is no evidence whether 
people who are loss averse in riskless choices are also loss averse in risky choices. We 
measure individual-level loss aversion in riskless choices in an endowment effect experiment 
by eliciting both WTA and WTP from each of our 360 subjects (randomly selected customers 
of a car manufacturer). All subjects also participate in a simple lottery choice task which 
arguably measures loss aversion in risky choices.  We find substantial heterogeneity in both 
measures of loss aversion. Loss aversion in the riskless choice task and loss aversion in the 
risky choice task are highly significantly and strongly positively correlated. We find that in 
both choice tasks loss aversion increases in age, income, and wealth, and decreases in 
education.  
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  11. Introduction  
 
Loss aversion – the psychological propensity that losses loom larger than equal-sized gains 
relative to a reference point – can occur in riskless and in risky choices, as argued in two 
seminal papers by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1991). An example for loss aversion in riskless choice is the 
‘endowment effect’ – the observation that experimental subjects who are randomly endowed 
with a commodity, ask for a selling price that exceeds substantially the buying price of 
subjects who merely have the possibility to buy the commodity (see Kahneman et al. 1990 for 
a very influential study). An example of loss aversion in risky choices is the observation that 
people reject small-scale gambles that have a positive expected value but may involve losses 
(e.g., Rabin 2000; Fehr and Goette 2007; Tom et al. 2007; see Wakker 2010, for a 
comprehensive review of models and empirical relationships).
1  
Our paper makes two contributions to this literature on loss aversion. First, we measure 
loss aversion in a riskless and a risky choice task. This will allow us to provide evidence on 
whether loss aversion in riskless choice is related to loss aversion in risky choices. To our 
knowledge nothing is known about this relationship. The riskless task we employ is an 
endowment effect experiment where we elicit the ‘willingness-to-accept’ (WTA) and  the 
‘willingness-to-purchase’ (WTP) from the same individual. The gap between WTA and WTP 
has been interpreted as evidence for loss aversion in riskless choice (e.g., Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991). The risky choice task consists of six simple lotteries with a 50-50 chance of 
a fixed gain of €6 and losses that vary from €-2 to €-7. Subjects simply have to indicate for 
each of the six lotteries whether they want to play this lottery or not (in case they reject a 
lottery their payoff is zero). This lottery choice task arguably measures loss aversion in risky 
choices (e.g., following Rabin 2000; Wakker 2005). While there are strong theoretical reasons 
why these two measures should be correlated, there are several reasons that might suggest a 
limited correlation. First, the idea that preferences are constructed (see e.g., the collection by 
Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006) challenges the idea that we would see significant correlations 
                                                 
1 Loss aversion has been invoked to explain many economic phenomena that are hard to understand under the 
assumption of reference-point independence. Prominent examples comprise behavior in financial markets 
(Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Odean 1998; Haigh and List 2005); selling patterns in housing markets (Genesove 
and Mayer 2001; Einiö, et al. 2008); coordination (Cachon and Camerer 1996); choice bracketing (Read, et al. 
1999; Rabin and Weizsäcker 2009); consumption behavior (Bowman, et al. 1999; Heidhues and Koszegi 2008); 
medical decision making (Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2002); marketing practices (Hardie, 
et al. 1993; Carmon and Ariely 2000); trade policy (Tovar 2009); labor supply (Camerer, et al. 1997; Goette, et 
al. 2004; Fehr and Goette 2007) and the importance of defaults and the status-quo bias in decision making 
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Johnson and Goldstein 2003). Camerer (2004) provides an overview of the 
field evidence, and Starmer (2000) a survey of theoretical explanations. See Sugden (2003), Schmidt, et al. 
(2008), and Köszegi and Rabin (2006) for recent theoretical frameworks of reference-dependent preferences that 
can explain many of these phenomena.  
  2across different ways of measuring loss aversion. For instance, numerous experiments have 
demonstrated that preferences differ across response modes. The endowment effect 
experiment involves two pricing tasks, while the lotteries involve a series of choice tasks. 
These two response modes are central to the classic demonstrations of preference reversals.  It 
is plausible that they trigger different cues or different weighting schemes for the attributes 
(Tversky et al. 1988). Second, research in psychology has shown that different measures of 
another preference characteristic, risk attitude, is often not highly correlated across different 
elicitation methods and domains (Johnson and Schkade 1989; Weber et al. 2002).  Similar 
evidence exists in experimental economics (e.g., Benz and Meier 2008).   
Our second contribution is to provide novel evidence on the degree of individual 
heterogeneity in loss aversion in riskless choices.
2 The elicitation of both valuations from the 
same individual distinguishes us from previous literature that focused predominantly on 
aggregate-level measures from between-subject designs. In these experiments different 
respondents were asked either the WTA or the WTP question. Thus, unlike most of previous 
literature on the endowment effect, we can address the importance of individual differences in 
loss aversion because we can investigate individual not only aggregate WTA-WTP gaps. To 
understand how our within-subject measurement of the individual WTA-WTP gap affects 
valuations we also run a between-subject study (akin to previous ones) where we elicit WTA 
and WTP from two different groups of respondents.  
We also examine the robustness of our findings by investigating the relationship 
between socio-demographic variables and loss aversion. In most studies the experimental 
participants are undergraduates who share very similar socio-demographic backgrounds 
(exceptions are Kovalchik et al. 2005, Booij and van de Kuilen 2009, and Dohmen et al. 
forthcoming). Using undergraduates precludes any inference about how socio-demographic 
variables affect loss aversion. By contrast, the participants of our experiments are a random 
sample of 660 customers of a German car manufacturer.
3 Our subjects comprise a large age, 
education, income and wealth spectrum. Of course, car customers may not be representative 
for the population at large, but we can answer how in our sample socio-demographic variables 
affect loss aversion both in riskless and in risky choices.   
                                                 
2  A few papers have looked at individual differences in loss aversion in risky choices (Abdellaoui 2000; 
Abdellaoui, et al. 2007; Schmidt and Traub 2002; Fehr-Duda, et al. 2006; Booij and van de Kuilen 2009; 
Harrison and Rutström 2009; Bruhin, et al. 2010) and in the context of medical decision making (Bleichrodt and 
Pinto 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto 2002). 
3 The experiments were part of a survey on motives to buy a car and on hypothetical valuations for certain 
product attributes of a car (see Johnson, et al. 2006 for the details). 
  3Our most important results are as follows. First, the individual WTA/WTP ratios are 
positively correlated with the individual switching points in the riskless choice task. We 
interpret this as evidence that people who exhibit loss aversion in a riskless choice task are 
also more likely to exhibit loss aversion in a risky choice task. The correlation between the 
two measures is 0.635 and significant at any conventional level. We believe this result is 
interesting for several reasons. From a methodological point of view it is comforting to know 
that we can measure loss aversion with two instruments that appear quite different to the 
subjects but arguably tap the same underlying theoretical construct. Measuring the same 
phenomenon with two different instruments provides also a methodologically valuable ‘cross-
validation’. The positive correlation also mutually reinforces the interpretation of the results 
of the two tasks in terms of loss aversion. Furthermore, we see the fact that choice behavior in 
the lottery task and the valuation gap in the endowment effect task are highly significantly 
correlated as evidence against arguments that the WTA-WTP gap is mainly due to subject 
misconception of the task (e.g., Plott and Zeiler 2005). If subject misconception would 
explain our WTA-WTP gap then we see no reason why the gap should be strongly correlated 
with choice behavior in the even simpler lottery choice task.
4     
Second, our two tasks also give us novel information about individual heterogeneity in 
loss aversion. This is in particular true for our endowment effect experiment. Before we 
describe our results, recall that most studies on the endowment effect only looked at aggregate 
level outcomes from between-subjects designs – e.g., whether the average WTA of a group of 
owners exceeds the average WTP of another group of buyers. Across many studies the typical 
ratio of average WTA to average WTP is around 2.
5 We replicate this classic finding in our 
benchmark between-subject study. We also show that the valuations in our main within-
subject study are not significantly different from the valuations in the benchmark between-
subject study. Our within-subjects design study reveals substantial heterogeneity in riskless 
individual-level loss aversion. We find that WTA/WTP = 2 for the median individual; the 
average individual has a WTA/WTP ratio of 2.62. Yet, there is a large variation in loss 
aversion: The standard deviation across individuals is 2.28. For 78 percent of individuals it 
holds that 1 < WTA/WTP ≤ 4. Ten percent of individuals have a ratio above 4 and for the rest 
the ratio is at most 1.  The implied values for loss aversion in risky choices are lower than 
those for riskless choices: the mean (median) is 1.63 (1.5) and the inter-quartile range of loss 
aversion is [1.2, 2] compared to [1.33, 3] in loss aversion in riskless choices.   
                                                 
4 We do not claim that task misconception plays no role at all, just that it may not be the only reason behind the 
WTA-WTP gap. See our concluding section for an extensive discussion.  
5 See, for instance, the meta-analyses by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and Sayman and Onculer (2005).  
  4Finally, we find that the socio-demographic variables affect both measures of loss 
aversion very similarly. Females appear to be slightly more loss averse than males, but the 
difference becomes insignificant once we control for other variables. The older cohort in our 
sample appears to be more loss averse than younger people. Higher education decreases, but 
does not eliminate, loss aversion. Higher income and higher wealth are both positively 
correlated with loss aversion. In sum, the socio-demographic variables affect both measures 
of loss aversion in a strikingly similar way. We see this finding mainly as support for the 





In total, 660 randomly selected customers of a large German car manufacturer participated in 
our two studies. All participants are German speaking and live in Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland. The data were collected in collaboration with a market research company. Data 
collection was done in personal interviews in 30 Austrian, German and Swiss cities. The 
interviews took place at the respondent’s home or at the local car dealer. All of our subjects 
had recently bought a car from this manufacturer. The subjects were randomly selected from 
an address file and recruited by telephone for a study on motives of buying a particular type 
of car. To cover their opportunity costs of participation and to induce them to participate at all 
every subject received a flat payment of €50. In addition to this we paid participants 
according to their decisions in the experiments.  
Twelve professional interviewers collected the data. They all received extensive training 
to familiarize them with the research design. Each respondent was always alone with an 
interviewer, undisturbed by car dealers or other customers. The experiment was embedded in 
this market research interview that lasted about one hour. While familiar with the 
experimental protocol, all interviewers were naïve about the experimental hypotheses. 
We conducted two separate studies, which involved two separate sets of participants. 
Both studies involved the elicitation of WTA and WTP of a toy car model from this 
manufacturer. The aim of Study 1 was to replicate procedures and results of previous WTA-
WTP studies in a between-subjects design. The novelty of this benchmark study is to provide 
a measure of aggregate loss aversion, derived from the WTA-WTP disparity in a large non-
student subject pool (300 customers of this manufacturer). This benchmark is important given 
the fact that our research did not take place in a laboratory, and to ensure the comparability of 
our within subject estimates of loss aversion to the usual between subject measures. The goal 
  5of Study 2 was to measure loss aversion at the individual level in a within-subject design. We 
complement our individual measure of loss aversion in riskless choice with one from a risky 
choice task, to answer the question whether these measures are correlated. All subjects who 
participated in the within-subject design study also took part in the lottery choice task. We 
now describe our designs in detail.   
In Study 1, in which 300 customers participated, half of the respondents were randomly 
assigned to answer the WTA valuation task and the other half the WTP task. Our procedure is 
very similar to most previous experiments on WTA and WTP elicitation tasks. We adapted 
the procedure by Kahneman et al. (1990), who used coffee mugs for their evaluation task, for 
our purposes.  
Specifically, subjects in the WTA valuation task were given a miniature model car and 
told that it was theirs. They were then asked to specify the price at which they would be 
willing to sell the car to the organizers of the scientific study. Subjects were shown a list of 
prices, varying from € 0 to € 10, with € 0.50 increments. For each of the prices they had to 
indicate whether they want to sell or not to sell their model car at this price. The format of 
each of the choices was as follows: 
 
If the price is € x …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
 
To give subjects an incentive to report their true valuation, we applied the Becker et al. 
1964 mechanism. After subjects had made their choice for all potential prices, a price was 
determined randomly. If the randomly selected price was one for which the respondent had 
indicated that they would sell the toy car, the model car was returned to the experimenter and 
the randomly determined price in cash was given to the respondent. If the respondent 
indicated that the chosen price was one at which they were not prepared to sell, they kept the 
model car.  The respondents were aware of this procedure.   
The procedures for the respondents in the WTP valuation task were identical, except 
that they were not endowed with a toy car. Instead they were shown a toy car and told that it 
could be theirs. They had to indicate for each of the prices between € 0 and € 10 whether they 
were prepared or not to buy at that price. Again, a random device determined the offered price 
and the indicated choice for that price was implemented accordingly. The exact wording of 
the valuation task is documented in the appendix.  
The results from Study 1 can be used to measure aggregate-level loss aversion. If we 
replicate with our subject pool and procedure the results from similar previous experiments, 
we should, on average, find a positive WTA-WTP difference. Such a difference has been 
  6interpreted as evidence for loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Bateman et al. 1997; 
Novemsky and Kahneman 2005).  
Our Study 2 involved an additional 360 randomly selected customers of the same car 
manufacturer. Here, the WTA and WTP valuation experiments were well integrated into a 
larger survey study. The purpose of our second study is to use the same procedures to 
measure individual-level loss aversion. If an individual’s relative value of WTA and WTP is a 
useful measure of individual-level loss aversion, then we must obtain both WTA and WTP 
from each respondent. Therefore respondents now answered both the WTA and the WTP 
valuation task. Thus, we have a within-subject design.
6   
Specifically, subjects were informed that we randomly assigned them a model car or 
not, and that an envelope containing their status as buyers or sellers would be opened at the 
end of the study. We applied the strategy method by asking the subjects to give us both their 
WTA in the case that they would own the model car and their WTP in the case they would not 
own it.  Subjects were told that one of the transactions would occur, depending upon whether 
the envelope assigned them to the buyer or seller role.  The order in which a particular 
respondent answered the two tasks was randomly determined. Half of the subjects started with 
the WTA valuation task, followed by the WTP valuation task; for the other half it was the 
other way round. The valuation tasks were separated by several market research survey 
questions related to the features of cars.  
We used the same questionnaire and procedures as in the between-subjects study but 
adapted the explanation to our within-subject design. For instance, if a participant started with 
the WTA task, he or she was told to make the decisions for the case that he or she would own 
this toy car. Later in the survey, the participants were confronted with the WTP task and 
asked to make their choices in case they would not own this toy car but were instead given the 
possibility to buy it. Again they were told that whether they would actually own the toy car or 
would be given the opportunity to buy it would be determined randomly at the very end of the 
study. Thus, our application of the strategy method to the WTA and WTP evaluation task 
allows us to obtain within-respondent estimates of loss aversion. 
The potential drawback of this within-subject elicitation procedure is that the answer on 
the first task may influence the answer on the second one. Therefore, the WTA and WTP 
                                                 
6 All previous endowment effect studies with riskless choice we are aware of used a between-subject design 
(akin to our benchmark study). There are a few studies which employ a within-subject design for eliciting WTA 
and WTP for lotteries. Examples include Harless (1989), Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), and Eisenberger and 
Weber (1995).   
  7results from the between-subjects elicitation of our first benchmark study serve as an 
important control.  
Our second goal is to measure loss aversion in risky choices. For that purpose we adapt 
a simple lottery choice task from Fehr and Goette (2007) that arguably measures loss aversion 
as well. In this choice task individuals decide for each of six lotteries whether they want to 
accept (that is, play it) or reject it (and receive nothing). In each lottery the winning price is 
fixed at 6 and only the losing price is varied (between 2 and 7). At the end of the experiment 
we randomly selected one lottery for pay (Cubitt et al. 1998). Figure 1 reproduces the 
decision sheet of the lottery choice task as presented to subjects.  
 
Figure 1 The lottery choice task 
Lottery   Accept Reject 
#1. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €2; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
#2. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €3; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
#3. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €4; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
#4. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €5; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
#5. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €6; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
#6. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose €7; if the coin turns up tails, you win €6.  O O 
 
Following Rabin (2000), Rabin and Thaler (2001), Schmidt and Zank (2005), Wakker 
(2005), Köbberling and Wakker (2005) and Fehr and Goette (2007), suggests that this task 
measures loss aversion rather than risk aversion. Rabin (2000), for instance, argues that risk 
aversion cannot plausibly explain choice behavior in small-stake risky prospects like ours. 
Risk aversion (i.e., a concave utility of wealth function) in such small-stakes lotteries would 
imply absurd degrees of risk aversion in high-stake gambles. Therefore, Rabin (2000) argues 
that under EU, people in such gambles should be risk neutral. In our risky choice task, people 
should therefore accept lotteries #1 to #5, which all have a non-negative expected value. If we 
nevertheless observe rejections of low-stake gambles with a positive expected value, then this 
might indicate loss aversion rather than risk aversion. This interpretation would certainly be 
vindicated if choice behavior in the lottery task would be correlated with the WTA-WTP gap 
as measured in the riskless valuation task.     
We can determine loss aversion in the risky choice task by applying cumulative prospect 
theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). A decision maker will be indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the lottery if w
+(0.5)v(G) = w
–(0.5)λ
riskyv(L), where L denotes the loss 
in a given lottery and G the gain; v(x) is the utility of the outcome x ∈ {G, L}, λ
risky denotes 
the coefficient of loss aversion in the risky choice task; and w
+(0.5) and w
–(0.5) denote the 
probability weights for the 0.5-chance of gaining G or losing L, respectively. If we assume 
  8that the same weighting function is used for gains and losses, w
+ = w
–  as proposed by Prelec 
1998, equation (3.1), p. 503, only the ratio v(G)/v(L) = λ
risky  defines an individual’s implied 
loss aversion in the lottery choice task. A frequent assumption on v(x) is linearity (v(x) = x) 
for small amounts, which gives us a very simple measure of loss aversion: λ
risky = G/L.  We 




We organize the presentation of our results as follows. We will first compare the valuations 
from our within- and between subjects designs in our riskless choice task.
7 Our second step 
will then be to describe the heterogeneity in individual-level loss aversion. Our third step 
examines loss aversion in a risky choice task and its relationship to loss aversion in riskless 
choice. Finally, we will look at the impact of socio-demographic characteristics on loss 
aversion.  
 
Result 1: The method of eliciting WTA and WTP from the same person in our within-
subject design did not change the answers systematically relative to a between-subjects 
control in which respondents only answered either a WTA question or a WTP question.  
 
Support: Figure 2 provides the main support for Result 1. It shows the cumulative 
frequency distributions of the elicited WTA and WTP measures. We distinguish whether the 
respective measure is elicited from the same person (“within-subject”) or from another 
participant of the study (“between-subject”).   
We find only small differences between the elicited values in Study 1 and Study 2. In 
the WTP valuation problems, the mean elicited WTP in the between-subjects mode of Study 1 
is €2.64, versus €2.96 in the within-subject mode of Study 2. For WTA we find slightly 
higher values in the between-subjects mode than in the within-subjects mode (€6.04 vs. 
€5.77). Yet, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (which compare distribution functions and not only 
means) find that the differences are very small and not significant (p>0.63).   
 
 
                                                 
7  For this analysis we discard the observations from subjects who submitted non-monotonic valuations (10 
percent in the between-subjects elicitation mode of Study 1 and 10.3 percent in the within-subjects elicitation 
mode of Study 2). 












































Next we check for sequence effects in the within-subject design. We do this in two 
ways. First, we compare whether WTA and WTP depends on whether WTA (or WTP) came 
first or second (i.e., we compare WTAfirst = WTAsecond; and WTPfirst = WTPsecond). We find no 
significant sequence effect of our within-subject elicitation in neither WTA nor WTP (p-
values > 0.63, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests). Second, we can compare the second stage 
measures, whether they be WTA or WTP to the same measure in our between-subjects study, 
where respondents only answered a single question. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not find 
any differences. The WTA of the participants of our between-subjects study is not 
significantly different from the potentially biased WTA of the participants of our within-
subjects study who answered WTA after WTP (p = 0.438). A similar conclusion holds for 
WTP (p=0.372).  We also ran a OLS regression (with robust standard errors clustered on 
subjects), pooling data from Study 1 and Study 2, that confirms that WTA and WTP are 
significantly different (p < 0.0001), but that there was no difference due to study or sequence 
(all p > 0.14). 
Our next result documents the often-reported average WTA-WTP disparity.  
 
Result 2:  There is a large difference between WTA and WTP. The ratio (mean 
WTA/mean WTP)between = 2.29, and the ratio (mean WTA/mean WTP)within = 1.95.   
 
Support: Figure 2 provides the main support for this result. In the between-subjects 
elicitation mode, the mean WTA is €6.04 whereas the mean WTP value is €2.64 (which 
  10implies a WTA/WTP-ratio of 2.29). The difference is highly significant according to both a 
two-sided t-test (p<0.001) and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p<0.0001). In the within-subject 
elicitation mode, the mean WTA is €5.77 and the mean WTP is €2.96; thus, the aggregate 
WTA-WTP ratio is 1.95. The median WTAs and WTPs are identical in both the between-
subjects and the within-subjects elicitation modes, 6 and 2.5), respectively,. Thus, the median 
valuation gives a ratio of 2.4 in both elicitation modes.  
Because the same person answered both valuation problems we applied a matched-pairs 
t-test. The difference between WTA and WTP is significant at all conventional levels 
(p<0.0001); the non-parametric Wilcoxon matched pairs test returns the same result 
(p<0.0001).    
Thus, on average the between-subjects mean WTA is 2.29 times higher than the mean 
WTP. The mean within-subject WTA is 1.95 times higher than the mean WTP. These results 
are in line with previous findings of studies which also elicited between-subject WTA’s and 
WTP’s (see Kahneman et al. 1990, Table 1). Kahneman et al. find WTA/WTP relations of 
2.21 in their mug experiments (Table 2). Knetsch (1989) reports a WTA/WTP relation of 
2.09. See Horowitz and McConnell (2002) and Sayman and Onculer (2005) for reviews. We 
conclude that our elicitation methods lead to results that are highly regular and consistent with 
previous findings from the laboratory.  
Our next result concerns the individual-level differences in the WTA/WTP ratios of 
Study 2. Figure 3 depicts the distribution (kernel density) of the individual WTA/WTP-ratios.  
 






















  11We will interpret an individual’s WTA/WTP ratio as a measure of loss aversion. Since 
our valuation task did not involve any risk, we denote the WTA/WTP-ratio as λ
riskless to 
distinguish it from a risky measure of loss aversion introduced above. If an individual is not 
loss averse, then his or her WTA should equal his or her WTP, that is, WTA/WTP ≡ λ
riskless = 
1. For a loss-averse individual it holds that WTA > WTP, that is, λ
riskless > 1, for WTP > 0. 
Out of the 323 respondents with monotonic evaluations, 310 individuals (that is 96 percent) 
report a WTP > 0.  
 
Result 3: Eighty-eight percent of individuals display loss aversion. That is λ
riskless ≡ 
WTA/WTP > 1. The mean λ
riskless is 2.62 and the median λ
riskless is 2.0. The interquartile range 
is [1.33, 3]. The standard deviation is 2.28.
8  
 
Support: We find that less than five percent of our subjects report λ
riskless < 1, that is, 
these people report WTA < WTP. For 7.1 percent λ
riskless = 1, as would be predicted by the 
standard economic argument that the reference point should not matter for the elicitation of 
reservation prices (neglecting income effects). For 88 percent of our respondents, λ
riskless > 1, 
that is, these individuals show some degree of loss aversion. Ten percent of them are very 
strongly loss averse in the sense that their λ
riskless > 4; the highest λ
riskless is 17. If we only 
classify those individuals as loss averse whose WTA differs by more than 20 (50) percentage 
points from their WTP, we find that 80.7 (67.1) percent of the respondents are loss averse. 
Our analysis has neglected diminishing sensitivity as assumed in prospect theory. We 
believe this is justified given the small stakes involved in our experiment and the findings in 
an experiment with comparable stakes by Fehr-Duda et al. (2006) who found that the vast 
majority of their subjects exhibit linear value functions. When we nevertheless incorporate 
diminishing sensitivity and assume a power utility function v(x) = x
α, α < 1 (see Wakker 2008 
for a discussion), the observed mean individual λ
riskless is reduced. If we use the α = .88 
estimate by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the mean [median] individual λ
riskless = 2.30 
[1.84]. More recent estimates by Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) who have data from a large 
representative subject pool most comparable to ours, suggest values of α around 0.95. In the 
latter case the mean [median] λ
riskless = 2.50 [1.93].
9 
Our third step is to look at loss aversion in risky choices. Recall that in our lottery 
choice task in general λ
risky = (w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5))(v(G)/v(L)). As for λ
riskless we only consider 
                                                 
8 The 99-percent confidence interval (bootstrapped standard errors, 1000 replications) is [2.29, 2.96].  
9 See Schmidt, et al. (2008), Abdellaoui, et al. (2007), Harrison and Rutström (2009) and Bruhin, et al. (2010) for 
further discussions of plausible α values. For simplicity we have also assumed that WTP (WTA) is the maximal 
(minimal) price at which someone switches from buying (selling) to not trading.  
  12monotonic acceptance decisions (91 percent of subjects display monotonicity). Table 1 
records the results of four different assumptions on probability weights and diminishing 
sensitivities for gains and losses. The rationale of these four models is to vary assumptions on 
probability weighting and diminishing sensitivities for gains and losses systematically to see 
their differential impact on implied levels of loss aversion. The benchmark case (model (1)) is 
that both probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity are unimportant.   Model (2) 
assumes that differential probability weighting for gains and losses is unimportant (that is, 
w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5) = 1) but allows for diminishing sensitivities for gains and losses (we take the 
median estimates of Booij and van de Kuilen 2009). Model (3) assumes diminishing 
sensitivity is unimportant but allows for differences in probability weights for gains and 
losses. We take the estimates of Abdellaoui (2000) (Table 9) who reports that w
+(0.5) = 0.394 
and w
–(0.5) = 0.456 for the median individual, which is one of the largest differences between 
w
+(0.5) and w
–(0.5) found in the literature (implying w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5) = 0.86).
10 It therefore 
provides an upper bound for the importance of differential probability weightings of gains and 
losses for the median individual in our context. Model (4) assumes that both probability 
weighting and diminishing sensitivities matter.   
According to Table 1, 12.58 percent accepted all lotteries with a non-negative expected 
value and only rejected lottery #6, which has a negative expected value. Hence, according to 
the benchmark model (1) their implied λ
risky = 1. Slightly more than sixteen percent of our 
respondents also accepted lottery #6, which has a negative expected value, that is, in model 
(1) their λ
risky < 0.87. Most participants rejected gambles with a positive expected value.   
Specifically, 70.86 percent of our respondents rejected at least lottery #5 or already some 
lottery #1 to #4. A few respondents (1.84 percent) rejected all six lotteries; for these people 
λ
risky > 3. The median respondent’s cutoff lottery was #4: he or she accepted lotteries #1 to #4 
and rejected lotteries #5 and #6, which in the benchmark model implies λ
risky = 1.2. The 
various assumptions on probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity change the values 
of implied λ
risky. However, the median individual is loss averse according to all four models.  
 
 
                                                 
10  See Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), Table 1 for a summary of parameter estimates reported in the earlier 
literature. For instance, for the weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), estimated 
parameters imply w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5) = 0.933. Fehr-Duda, et al. (2006) report w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5) between 0.91 and 
0.964 (calculated from their data in Table III). The estimates in Bruhin, et al. (2010, Table IX) range from 0.82 
to 1.04. Abdellaoui, et al. (2008) cannot reject that w
+(0.5)/w
–(0.5) = 1 in their data.  




β), ω ≡ w
+(0.5)/w
-(0.5) 
Acceptance behavior  








risky under various assumptions of 
probability weights and diminishing sensitivities 
for gains and losses 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












7) Reject all lotteries  1.84  € <2  >3.00  >2.90  >2.49  >2.58 
6) Accept lottery #1, reject lotteries #2 to #6  9.51  € 2  3.00  2.90  2.49  2.58 
5) Accept lotteries #1 and #2, reject lotteries #3 to #6  15.95  € 3  2.00  2.00  1.72  1.72 
4) Accept lotteries #1 to #3, reject lotteries #4 to #6   25.77  € 4  1.5  1.53  1.32  1.29 
3) Accept lotteries #1 to #4, reject lotteries #5 to #6  17.79  € 5  1.2  1.25  1.07  1.03 
2) Accept lotteries #1 to #5, reject lotteries #6  12.58  € 6  1.00  1.06  0.91  0.86 
1) Accept all lotteries  16.56  € ≥7  ≤0.87  ≤0.92  ≤0.79  ≤0.73 
Median     1.50  1.53  1.32  1.29 
Interquartile range      1.2-2.0  1.25-2.0  1.07-2.49  1.03-1.72 
Notes: (1) benchmark parameters: no probability weighting, and no diminishing sensitivity. (2) no probability 
weighting, but diminishing sensitivity.  (3) Probability weighting, but no diminishing sensitivity. (4) Probability 
weighting and diminishing sensitivity. Parameters on diminishing sensitivity taken from Booij and van de Kuilen 
(2009); parameters on ω taken from Abdellaoui (2000).  
 
 
A comparison with λ
riskless also suggests that the implied λ
risky are lower. Our next result 
addresses the question how the two measures of loss aversion are related. If the measures 
were correlated, then they would mutually reinforce the interpretation that each respective 
measure of loss aversion provides convergent evidence. Result 4 summarizes the main result 
of our paper.  
 
Result 4: The WTA/WTP ratio is highly significantly positively correlated with the 
switch point in the lottery choice task.  Hence, the implied levels of loss aversion are 
positively correlated. The implied levels of λ
risky are lower than those of λ
riskless.  
 
Support: Figure 4 illustrates Result 4. For our graphical illustration we use the 
assumptions of model (1) in Table 1. On the x-axis this figure shows the λ
risky-measure as 
implied by the switch point of the risky choice task (see Figure 1 and Table 1, model (1)). On 
the y-axis we depict the mean λ
riskless (WTA/WTP ratio under the assumption that α = 1) from 
Study 2. We indicate the mean of λ
riskless and the 99-percent confidence bounds (bootstrapped 
  14standard errors, 1000 replications). The size of symbols is proportional to the number of 
underlying observations (see Table 1 for details). 
Figure 4 shows that λ
riskless and λ
risky are clearly positively correlated. For instance, 
individuals who have an average λ
risky < 0.87 have a λ
riskless = 1.34 on average. Individuals 
who have a λ
risky = 2 have an average λ
riskless = 3.03. A Spearman rank order correlation 
between the two measures confirms the relationship observed in Figure 4 (Spearman’s ρ = 
0.635; p<0.0001; n=281). This also holds if we exclude the ‘outlier’ λ
riskless = 6.21 for people 
with a λ
risky ≥ 3. A regression analysis confirms this conclusion.
11 
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that loss aversion in riskless choice and loss 
aversion in risky choices are positively correlated at the individual level. Notice that the fact 
that λ
riskless and λ
risky are correlated does not depend on whether one believes in the exact value 
of λ
riskless or λ
risky as we have determined them in Table 1 as measures of loss aversion. The 
correlation simply confirms that a subject’s WTA/WTP-ratio and his or her acceptance 
behavior in the lottery choice task are highly significantly related.  
 
Figure 4 Relationship between loss aversion in risky and riskless choice under linear 











































Three remarks are in order in interpreting this result. First, if the often noted WTA-WTP 
disparity were largely due to subject misconception of the task (Plott and Zeiler 2005) then 
                                                 
11 An OLS regression using the assumptions of model (1) in Table 1 returns the following: λ
riskless = 0.066(0.564) 
+ 1.737(0.400)*λ
risky, R
2 = 0.21, robust standard errors in parentheses. Controlling for socio-demographics (see 
below) does not change this relationship significantly but reduces the coefficient of λ
risky to 1.522.  
  15there would be no reason why λ
riskless and λ
risky are positively correlated. Second, in our view, 
the positive correlation provides convergent evidence for loss aversion. If we assume that the 
lottery choice task reveals loss aversion, then the fact that λ
riskless and λ
risky are positively 
correlated reinforces the interpretation that the endowment effect is due to loss aversion. A 
similar argument holds vice versa.  Third, we note that this relationship is observed across 
two different response modes, suggesting that the underlying construct of loss aversion 
account exists across both a pair of judgment tasks (WTA and WTP) and a risky choice task. 
As indicated above, Figure 4 reveals that λ
riskless and λ
risky are not the same. λ
riskless 
exceeds λ
risky for all levels of λ
risky. If λ
riskless would be identical to λ
risky then λ
riskless would be 
on the diagonal, which is clearly not the case; λ
risky is highly significantly lower than λ
riskless 
(Wilcoxon matched pairs test, z=11.1, p<0.0001; see also footnote 12). Why this is the case is 
a task left for future research. One possibility is that λ
risky which involves choices, measures 
only loss aversion for money, and there is evidence that loss aversion for money is lower than 
for commodities (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; the extent is debated, however (Bateman 
et al. 2005)). Because it uses a tradeoff, λ
riskless reflects loss aversion for both money and the 
model car. Another possibility is that there is an emotional attachment to the car, a factor that 
increases loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009). 
The final step in our analysis concerns the impact of socio-demographic factors on loss 
aversion. Since our subject pool is only representative of one group of customers but not for 
the population at large we see this analysis mainly as robustness check whether the socio-
demographic background of our subjects affects the two measures of loss aversion similarly.
12  
Figure 5 gives a first impression of the link between socio-economic variables and loss 
aversion by plotting the bi-variate relationships between the mean WTA/WTP ratio as a 
measure of riskless loss aversion and the mean lottery choice category (see Table 1) as an 
indicator of loss aversion in risky choices. For both variables higher values indicate more loss 
aversion. We look at six economically interesting variables: gender (panel A), age (panel B), 
household income (panel C), household wealth (panel D), education (panel E) and occupation 
(panel F).  We also indicate in Figure 5 the fraction of participants who fall in a particular 
socio-demographic category.  
Figure 5 reveals several striking observations. First, the qualitative patterns of both 
measures of loss aversion are very similar in all six panels. Second, we find a small but 
significant gender gap in both measures (panel A). According to both measures, females are 
                                                 
12 Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) report experiments with a representative sample from the Dutch population. 
The gender and education effects we report below are consistent with their findings.  
  16on average more loss averse than males. This gender gap is supported by two-sided Mann-
Whitney tests, which return p<0.05 for both measures.  
 













































































































































































































































































































WTA/WTP Lottery choice category






Notes: 1) Lottery choice category: 1 = no loss aversion, 7 = high loss aversion. See Table I for a 
description. 2) Percentages indicate the fraction of participants in a particular socio-economic category.  
 
 
Third, as panel B shows, older people tend to be more loss averse in both their riskless 
valuations and in their risky choices (Spearman rank order correlations, p<0.05). Fourth, the 
higher the household income is, the higher is loss aversion (panel C). A similar conclusion 
  17holds for wealth (panel D).
13 Higher education seems to decrease loss aversion (panel E) in 
both measures (Spearman rank order correlations, p<0.05) but does not eliminate it. Different 
occupational groups have different degrees of loss aversion (Kruskal-Wallis tests, p<0.0001 
for both measures). Finally, if we compare the implied λ
risky and λ
riskless separately for each 
category of each variable (using model (1) of Table 1) we find that λ
riskless is mostly 
significantly higher than λ
risky. 
Of course, bi-variate correlations can be misleading. Therefore, we conduct a multiple 
regression analysis that controls for all available variables. The next result records our 
findings. 
 
Result 5:  The socio-demographic variables affect both measures of loss aversion 
similarly. We find no gender effect and an increase of loss aversion across age cohorts. 
Higher education decreases loss aversion and household income and wealth are associated 
with increases in loss aversion.  
 
Support: We run regressions for both measures of loss aversion. We document the 
results in Table 2. We start with the WTA/WTP measure. We estimated three models, using 
OLS and calculating robust standard errors. In model (1) we only included a dummy for 
females and age dummies (taking the youngest group (age ≤ 34) as the reference group. We 
find that females are more loss averse than males but the difference is not significant (in 
contrast to the bi-variate analysis).  Moreover, the older respondents are the more loss averse 
they get. The age effect is highly significant, in particular for people older than 55 years.
 14 
These strong age effects are interesting, both because they may affect financial decision-
making across the lifespan (Agarwal et al. 2009) and because they may be related to well-
documented decreases in memory performance (Salthouse 2004). Weber and Johnson (2006) 
have speculated that such deficits may increase loss aversion in older adults. Of course our 
analysis cannot separate these age effects from cohort effects.  
Model (2) adds dummies for education and income. We find that higher education 
reduces loss aversion. Quite surprisingly, higher income is positively correlated with loss 
                                                 
13 The Spearman rank order correlations are significantly positive at p<0.0001 for all four bi-variate correlations 
of income, wealth and WTA/WTP and lottery choice categories.  
14 At first sight, the result that older people are more loss averse stands in contrast to Kovalchik, et al. (2005) 
who do not find loss aversion in their subject pool of old people (age > 70 years). However, Kovalchik et al note 
that their old subjects are highly educated relative to their age group. Thus, since education reduces loss 
aversion, our results might be consistent with those of Kovalchik et al.  
  18aversion.
15 Regression (3) includes wealth instead of income.
16  It turns out that higher wealth 
and loss aversion are also highly significantly positively correlated.  
Models (4) to (6) replicate the analysis for our risky choice task using ordered probit 
estimation. We regress the lottery choice categories (see Table 1) on the same set of 
explanatory variables as in models (1) to (3). We get very similar results, qualitatively. The 
only difference arises in model (5) where the middle income category is not significant for the 
lottery choice tasks, whereas it is highly significant in the riskless task.  
 
Table 2 Socio-economic characteristics and measures of loss aversion 
Dependent variable  WTAi/WTPi  Lottery  choice  category 
Method OLS    ordered  probit 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Female  0.267 0.070 0.297    0.171 0.075 0.168 
  (0.286) (0.274) (0.271)   (0.127)  (0.128)  (0.131) 
Age  35  –  54  0.492 0.123 0.455    0.451 0.235 0.392 
 (0.212)**  (0.251)  (0.209)**   (0.169)*** (0.195)  (0.182)** 
Age  55+  2.074 1.467 1.925    0.999 0.553 0.830 
 (0.511)***  (0.471)*** (0.493)***  (0.193)*** (0.209)***  (0.204)***
High  school  degree   -1.045  -0.893     -0.405  -0.303 
   (0.325)*** (0.320)***    (0.133)***  (0.126)** 
University  degree  -1.589  -1.249     -0.797  -0.550 
   (0.409)*** (0.386)***    (0.229)***  (0.212)***
Income Euro 30k – 70k    0.792        0.320   
   (0.245)***       (0.216)   
Income  Euro  70k+   1.845      1.216  
   (0.364)***      (0.240)***  
Wealth Euro 30k – 100k      0.483        0.449 
     (0.229)**       (0.175)** 
Wealth Euro 100k+      1.084        0.875 
     (0.447)**       (0.235)***
Constant  1.865 2.092 2.055         
 (0.193)***  (0.235)*** (0.277)***        
Observations  310 310 310    326 326 326 
R-squared  0.11 0.20 0.17        
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
We see the fact that the socio-economic variables affect the WTA/WTP-ratio and the 
lottery choice category in a qualitatively very similar way as further evidence that both 
measures reflect a similar underlying psychology – loss aversion. There are strong theoretical 
arguments why loss aversion underlies the endowment effect and decisions in the lottery 
choice task. Our dual finding that the WTA/WTP-ratios and the lottery choices are highly 
significantly correlated and that the socio-demographic variables affect both measures in a 
                                                 
15 Income and education are positively correlated, but the correlation is surprisingly weak (ρ=0.225).  
16 Not surprisingly, income and wealth are highly significantly, and quite strongly, correlated (ρ=0.475). 
  19qualitatively similar way, supports the interpretation of observed behavior in terms of loss 
aversion.  
As mentioned, we see our analysis mainly as a robustness check, since our subject pool, 
while quite varied according to many socio-demographic dimensions, is not representative for 
the population at large.  Many of the relationships may be specific to the particular sampling 
represented by the car company’s customers, and the particular experience of each cohort in 
our sample. However, the fact that the socio-demographic variables affect choices in a very 
systematic way suggests that it is worthwhile to study loss aversion in a more representative 
sample (see for instance Dohmen et al. forthcoming for an investigation of risk attitudes and 
Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) for an investigation of prospect theory).   
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we investigated loss aversion in riskless and risky choices. Our data are 
consistent with the existence of loss aversion both in riskless and risky choices. People who 
are loss averse in the riskless valuation task (by showing a WTA/WTP-ratio >1) are also loss 
averse in the risky choice task because they reject 50-50 gambles with positive expected 
payoffs. We see this finding – which comes from a large non-student sample – as the main 
contribution of this paper.  
Our results emphasize that the degree of loss aversion can vary across situations and 
participants of different levels of experience. A natural question is what causes this variation.  
One possibility, raised by Plott and Zeiler (2005), is that respondents may have different 
degrees of misunderstanding across situations and tasks. However, two aspects of our results 
suggest that simple misunderstanding is not, by itself, responsible for all this variation.   
First, these two measures are very different. The choice between gambles involves risk, 
and a single choice between the status quo and several options. The WTA and WTP task 
involves two valuations of the same single object, each from a different perspective. Despite 
these differences, they show a high degree of agreement. It is difficult to see what could be 
the common element of the two methods that is misunderstood. A misunderstanding of 
strategic considerations, for example, might play a role in the valuation question, but it is less 
apparent how it would produce similar results in the choice among gambles.  
Second, the effect of demographics is very similar for these two measures. It seems 
difficult to reconcile this pattern occurring solely as a result of miscomprehension. We think a 
more profitable way of proceeding is not to doubt the existence of loss aversion in some 
  20economic choice, but to focus on understanding the boundary conditions surrounding loss 
aversion, such as whether it holds for ordinary transactions (e.g., Novemsky and Kahneman 
2005, Bateman et al. 2005) or for experienced traders (e.g., List 2003).   
Furthermore, neuroscientific evidence (Tom et al. 2007), evidence from non-human 
primates (Chen et al. 2006) and from young children (Harbaugh et al. 2001) suggests that loss 
aversion may be deeply rooted, which would imply that for many people it takes experience 
and learning to overcome loss aversion. Johnson et al. (2007) propose a cognitive account for 
loss aversion that focuses on the retrieval of aspects of the transaction from memory.  Such a 
cognitive view seems consistent with the observed decrease of loss aversion with education 
and the increase with age, given the well documented evidence for cognitive decline.  
We also note that the current design has two features that we believe are important to 
producing within-respondent estimates of loss aversion. The first is the separation of the 
elicitation of WTA vs. WTP by several intervening tasks such as standard market research 
surveys. We suspect that preventing simple recall of the prior price is crucial to obtaining 
within-subjects measures. The second is the use of a strategy method which allows the 
respondent to value the objects in two different frames, without actually knowing whether or 
not they are endowed.  We cannot tell if either or both are necessary to produce within-
respondent estimates, but suggest that without these, respondents may have remembered their 
first answer, and because of the need to appear consistent, would have produced WTA and 
WTP prices that were closer together. 
 




“In the following question there are no right or wrong answers. Your response should only reflect your own 
preferences. As the other parts of the questionnaire this following question is part of a scientific research project 
on how people make economic choices.  
 
We will give you the following little toy car which you can keep.   
 
THIS TOY CAR IS FOR YOU TO KEEP! 
 
If you do not want to keep the toy car, you can sell it to the organizers of this scientific study. In the table below 
please mark the minimum acceptable price at which you are willing to sell the car.   
 
•  If at our offer price you have indicated in the table that you are willing to sell the toy car, you will 
receive this amount in cash instead of the toy car. 
•  If at our offer price you have indicated in the table that you are not willing to sell the toy car, you will 
keep your toy car. 
 
The price at which we will buy your toy car will be randomly determined and for sure be between €0 and €10. 
That is, our offered price will be determined by rolling dice after you have filled in the table below.  All prices 
are equally likely.  There is a scientific reason for proceeding this way.  Since you cannot influence the price, 
which will be determined randomly, you have an incentive to state the price that corresponds to your true 
preference. Once you have made your choice, you cannot change it anymore. We will also not be able to 
negotiate about the price.  
 
Price in €  Please make a cross in each line depending on whether you are ready or not to sell 
the toy car at the respective price to us.   
 
If the price is € 0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 0.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 1.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 1.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 2.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 2.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 3.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 3.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 4.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 4.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 5.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 5.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 6.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 6.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 7.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 7.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 8.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 8.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 9.0 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 
If the price is € 9.5 …  … I am ready to sell ___                 I am not ready to sell: ___ 





The questionnaire for eliciting WTP was adapted accordingly.  
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